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PLANNING THE FREEWAY: INTERIM
CONTROLS IN HIGHWAY PROGRAMS
DANIEL R. MANDELKER*
G OOD PLANNING always means delay. Three to seven years
may elapse in the Interstate and National Defense Highway
System from the first preliminary steps to final construction, yet
serious problems of land use control are presented during this in-
terim period. Often the mere announcement of highway plans will
trigger a wave of speculative buying which will inflate land values.
Costs will also be increased if private development occurs across the
right-of-way, and less tangible but equally harmful effects may be
felt if development along the highway takes place which will gener-
ate either too much traffic at critical points or traffic of the wrong
kind.
The vulnerability of the highway during the time preceding land
acquisition has stimulated a variety of statutory controls which are
aimed at reserving future rights-of-way against impairment. Few of
these statutes confer protective authority on the state highway
agency, however, and most are directed to the municipal and county
level. The municipal or county official map is the most explicit
reservation device. An official map reserves land for street and road
purposes, and the enabling legislation prohibits any improvements
- BA. 1947, LL.B. 1949, University of Wisconsin; J.S.D. 1956, Yale University. Au-
thor, GREEN BELTS AND URBAN GROWTH: ENGUSH TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING IN Ac-
TION (1962); Professor of Law, Washington University. This article is an adaptation of
Part I of a report prepared for the Bureau of Public Roads, United States Department
of Commerce, under Contract No. CPR 11-8006 with the University of Wisconsin School
of Law. The report, entitled "A Study of Future Acquisition and Reservation of
Highway Rights-of-Way," was prepared under the supervision of Professor J. H.
Beuscher of the University of Wisconsin School of Law. Part II, dealing with acquisi-
tion of rights-of-way in advance of need, was written by Professor G. Graham Waite
of the University of Maine School of Law.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
in the street bed, subject to the grant of a variance in hardship cases.
More indirect controls may also be used. Subdividers seeking pub-
lic approval of their subdivision plats may be required to make an
outright dedication which allows for future widening or to reserve
street frontage pending future acquisition. Building setbacks1 may
be enacted which legislate front yards, to be kept free of structures,
and which thereby incidentally reserve land for street widening pur-
poses.
Underlying all of these techniques for interim control are com-
mon problems of administration. The underlying constitutional
issue is also the same-whether an uncompensated prohibition upon
the development of privately held land can be imposed prior to
acquisition. While the problems of administration and constitu-
tionality may be similar, however, each of these controls has had a
different history, which in turn has affected its judicial reception
and method of application. This article will review the existing
techniques for interim regulation, outline their derivation and con-
temporary basis in statute, and examine the constitutional questions
involved. On the basis of firsthand observations in several areas, an
assessment will be made of the problems in administration.2 Deficien-
cies in existing controls will be assessed, and a method of regula-
tion will be proposed which can be used more effectively in the
building of interstate and other modern highway systems.
I
SETBACKS UNDER THE POLICE POWER
A. The Constitutional Issues
Front yards have been typical of American residential develop-
ment; and municipal ordinances, even before the advent of zoning,3
1 Nomenclature here, as in other areas of planning law, may be confusing. The
American Society of Planning Officials applies the term "setback" to "any requirement
that buildings be set back" and gives the setback as described in the text the name
"front yard requirement." ASPO PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE, INFoRmATION REP'T No.
119, PROTECTING FUTURE STREETS: OFFICIAL MAPS, SETBACKS AND SucH 5 (1959). How-
ever, the more generic term "setback" will be used in this article to denote the usual
police power light and air requirements because it is more in accord with conventional
use in the statutes and cases.
2 The appraisal of the regulatory programs is based upon data gathered from
discussions with highway officials and from visits with planning commissions and state
highway agencies in Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Wisconsin.
8 McCavic v. DeLuca, 233 Minn. 372, 46 N.W.2d 873 (1951); Kipp v. Incorporated
Village of Ardsley, 18 App. Div. 2d 1012, 216 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1961); Fisher v. City of
[Vol. 1964:439
PLANNING THE FREEWAY
often established a building line, measured from the edge or center-
line of a street, which reserved a front yard against improvements.
No compensation is ordinarily required for the front yard reserva-
tion, and this technique will prove useful in keeping down acquisi-
tion costs should the street ultimately be widened. Setback require-
ments are now commonly a part of municipal or county zoning
ordinances.
Early cases, impressed because the use of property was totally
restricted, held the front yard setback unconstitutional. Beginning
with the favorable United States Supreme Court decision in Gorieb
v. FoxI4 however, the state decisions began to reach an opposite re-
sult,5 and the setback now appears constitutionally secure. Its
rationale nevertheless remains problematic. Gorieb rejected a sup-
posed contrast with zoning and upheld the setback as a density
control which prevented encroachment on light and air. This ap-
proach emphasizes the urban aspects of setbacks and focuses upon
their aesthetic benefits. Because state courts may balk at a favorable
ruling when forced to rely upon an aesthetic justification, the state
decisions have avoided this problem by relating the setback to safety
considerations, which are easier to justify. For example, a case may
suggest that a setback advances traffic safety by preserving the line
of sight, or (dubiously) that it assists fire protection by making
space available for firefighting equipment. A more adequate de-
fense would focus upon other factors related to traffic safety, appli-
cable in rural as well as urban areas. For example, setbacks may be
Irving, 345 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (under home rule power). For selected
laws authorizing setback ordinances independent of planning and zoning enabling
acts, see ILL. RFv. STAT. ANN. ch. 24, §§ 11-14-1 to -4 (1962) (municipalities); ILL. REV.
STAT. ANN. Ch. 34, §§ 3201-04 (1960) (counties); IowA CODE ANN. § 368.10 (Supp. 1962)
(municipalities); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8038 (n) (Supp. 1962) (state highway commission);
N.Y. TOWN I.ww § 130(25); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 89(30); ORE. REV. STAT. § 227.290
(cities); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 39103 (i), 46225, 56521, 65753 (1957) (selected munici-
palities); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1448 (12) (1961) (state highway commission).
'274 U.S. 603 (1927).
5 The cases prior to 1935 are reviewed in BLAcK, BUILDING LINES AND RESERVATIONS
FOR FuTuRE S xmas 118-34 (1935), which is the classic work. For cases since then
which have held setbacks constitutional, see Town of Atherton v. Templeton, 198
Cal. App. 2d 146, 17 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1961); Flinn v. Treadwell, 120 Colo. 117, 207
P.2d 967 (1949); Papioanu v. Commissioners of Rehoboth, 25 Del. Ch. 327, 20 A.2d
447 (1941); Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233
Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954); Boardman v. Davis, 231 Iowa 1227, 3 N.W.2d 608
(1942); Moore v. City of Pratt, 148 Kan. 53, 79 P.2d 871 (1938); City of Beatrice v.
Williams, 172 Neb. 889, 112 N.W.2d 16 (1961); Matter of Richards v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeal, 285 App. Div. 287, 137 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1955). See also Kratovil & Harrison,
Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CAur. L. REv. 596, 636 (1954).
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used to eliminate billboards, plantings, and other attention-detrac-
tors from the roadside. Better design of access can be afforded if
the setback is used to provide a frontage road. More recently the
cases have omitted discussion of these questions and have accepted
the setback under familiar presumption of constitutionality rules.0
In his classic treatise on the subject of building lines and street
reservations, Russell Van Nest Black intimated that setbacks could
protect future street widenings as well as accomplish the traditional
health and welfare objectives, 7 an expectation which has been dis-
appointed. When Black wrote, many municipalities did use setback
ordinances to safeguard street widenings, a practice which is still
common. But courts have objected to the explicit use of a police
power ordinance to hold down the price of property destined for
ultimate acquisition.8 While the purpose of a restriction arguably is
unimportant if its effect is the same, the setback required for street
widening is usually wider than the setback which would normally
be imposed. Consequently, the affected owner can successfully con-
tend that the ordinance has been applied to him in a discriminatory
manner.9 An instructive example is Mayer v. Dade County,10 a
Florida case. There the landowners expected to build a hospital.
Their south property line fronted on the centerline of a proposed
street; and in order to protect the street, the county required an
0 Town of Atherton v. Templeton, supra note 5; Highway 100 Auto Wreckers, Inc.
v. City of West Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 637, 96 N.W.2d 85 (1959). For one of several cases
which accepts aesthetic considerations as a factor which bears on the general welfare,
see Kerr's Appeal, 294 Pa. 246, 144 Ad. 81 (1928).
7 BLACK, op. cit. supra note 5, at 116.
' Gait v. Cook County, 405 Ill. 396, 91 N.E.2d 395 (1950); City of Miami v. Romer,
73 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954) (second appeal). Cf. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n V.
Anderson, 184 Ark. 763, 43 S.W.2d 356 (1931) (town ordinance held invalid which
prohibited new building within extended boundaries of a highway); Householder v.
Town of Grand Island, 114 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 805, 113
N.E.2d 555 (1953). On this point, the Romer litigation is instructive. On the first
appeal, the setback was upheld under the police power, even though the court noted
that the city may have contemplated a street widening. City of Miami v. Romer,
58 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1952). On the second appeal, the case was sent back for trial
on the basis of an amended complaint which alleged that the real purpose of the
restriction was to prevent the building of improvements in order to hold down the
ultimate cost of acquisition.
' See Gait v. Cook County, supra note 8 (setback twice as wide as was customary).
A possible exception is Highway 100 Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. City of West Allis, 6
Wis. 2d 637, 96 N.W.2d 85 (1959), in which a 210 foot setback from the highway
was imposed under the power to license junk yards. The court found support from
a statute which imposed a 750 foot setback on similar uses in open areas. Cf. Fisher
v. City of Irving, 345 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
10 82 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1955).
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additional fifteen foot setback. This requirement was successfully
challenged, the court pointing out that the hospital had been "singled
out" for an "unusual" application of the setback ordinance.
B. Inadequancies of the Setback as a Reservation Device"
When the setback is used to plan ahead for street widening in
developed areas; difficulties may be encountered which are an ex-
tension of the "unusual" application of the ordinance in the Mayer
case. -A good example is Zampieri v. Township of River Vale,12 a
.New Jersey Supreme Court decision. River Vale, a township on the
developing urban fringe, had changed its setback requirement at a
busy intersection to sixty instead of forty feet. Street widening was
one of the purposes of the change. Without deciding that the use
of the setback power for widening purposes was necessarily uncon-
stitutional, the court held the ordinance invalid as applied in these
circumstances. Existing nonconformities had established a pattern
which the ordinance was not allowed to change. A substantial num-
ber of buildings had been constructed at the intersection, almost
half of which were nonconforming to the amended setback line and
some of which were new. Vacant parcels were also present in the
immediate area, and new buildings on these parcels would have been
required to recede some twenty feet from existing properties in
order to conform to the amended building line. At other locations
the amended setback, in conjunction with rear yard requirements,
made it impossible to build on vacant land.
" Fisher v. City of Irving, 345 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), might be read
as approving the establishment of a setback in order to reserve frontage sufficient for
a service road. The owner of lots along a highway protested an eighty foot setback.
Adjoining owners on each side had arranged with the city for a service road adjoining
the highway; and for this reason, they were given a thirty foot setback measured
apparently from the property line abutting on the service road. The lotowner in
this case was denied a thirty foot setback solely because he had not provided the
service road, and the denial was affirmed by the board of adjustment.
The court sustained the board on the usual grounds that it found no abuse of
discretion. Part of the problem lay in the manner in which the lotowner presented
his case. "Ironically, appellants' complaint is not to the 80-foot setback . . .'but relates
to the failure of the City to purchase (or condemn) their 50-foot frontage and thus
place them on a parity with others so treated .... Fisher v. City of Irving, supra
at 549. The court was able to find that a failure to condemn was well within the
discretionary power of the city. In addition, eighty feet was found to be a reasonable
setback under the circumstances. Moreover, the adjoining service roads had already
established the pattern in the area, and to permit the lotowner in this case to build
an additional fifty feet forward might well have been discriminatory to the other
owners.
12 29 N.J. 599, 152 A.2d 28 (1959).
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Difficulties have also arisen with widening setbacks in rural areas.
In Schmalz v. Buckingham Township Zoning Bd.,13 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court invalidated a fifty foot highway setback which
had been applied to open and undeveloped land in a rural town-
ship. The court referred to the usual objectives of the setback-
lessening of congestion, provision of light and air, and protection
of the public safety. That a setback line would accomplish these
objects in populous areas, it held, did not justify its use in sparsely
populated rural sections. The lower court had sustained the ordi-
nance in part because the area might be urbanized in the near
future, but this justification was not accepted on appeal.
Read together, the Zampieri and Schmalz cases throw some doubt
on the use of the setback to reserve future rights-of-way and raise
questions about its effectiveness in rural areas. But can either case
be accepted as a proper reading of the police power? The Schmalz
opinion is unnecessarily narrow, although understandable in light
of the customary reasons which have been advanced in support of
setback controls. Zampieri ignored the possible use as a planning
tool of highway reservations, which can be helpful even in areas
which have been substantially developed. In defense of the Zampieri
court, however, the ordinance there was clearly ad hoc, and the
failure to provide an underlying plan emphasized the discriminatory
nature of the widening amendment. A better factual record in the
Schmalz case and a better overall community planning record in
the Zampieri case might have led to different results.
Judicial reaction to hardship cases under setback ordinances
further underlines their limitations. The ordinance will be invali-
dated if the setback does not leave a buildable area on the lot;
and if a hardship variance is available under the ordinance, it is
always granted in cases like this.14 A good recent example is a Cali-
18389 Pa. 295, 132 A.2d 233 (1957). Cf. Householder v. Town of Grand Island, 114
N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 805, 113 N.E.2d 555 (1953) (ninety foot
widening line applied to property on a sparsely settled island held unconstitutional).
1, Compare Kerr's Appeal, 294 Pa. 246, 144 Atl. 81 (1928) (37% buildable area
sufficient in residential but perhaps insufficient in commercial area), with Kipp v.
Incorporated Village of Ardsley, 205 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd on other
grounds, 13 App. Div. 2d 1012, 216 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1961) (setback unconstitutional if
50% or 70% of property restricted from building). The lower court opinion in the
Kipp case had suggested that the ordinance would be unconstitutional if it did not
provide a variance procedure because the owner would then have no way to test the
reasonableness of the ordinance as applied to his property. Cf. Young v. Town of
West Hartford, 111 Conn. 27, 149 Ad. 205 (1930).
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fornia decision in which setbacks applied to both sides of a tri-
angular lot reduced the buildable area to ten square feet.15 The
most common cases are corner lots to which setbacks are applied
on both frontages. 16 If the escape provision is written as an excep-
tion rather than as a variance, hardship need not be proved, and
administrative relief is even easier to obtain.17
While the need for relief in cases like these is understandable,
the difficulty is that the critical points for the application of widen-
ing proposals are at intersections. Proposals for new highways create
similar problems. They may cut irregularly through an established
lot pattern, creating innumerable hardship cases which will also
weaken the effectiveness of the scheme. As an additional compli-
cating factor, setback ordinances are not drawn with highway needs
in mind, and they do not authorize the granting of variances under
conditions which can limit the impact of the nonconforming use
upon the highway improvement.'8
C. An Evaluation of Setbacks
Setbacks can make an incidental but important contribution to
highway programs, especially when the front yard which has been
reserved is sufficient in depth for widening purposes. The compara-
tive simplicity of setbacks and the fact that they are well-established
under the police power contribute to their continued use at the
municipal and county level. However, substantial difficulties limit
1 Hoshour v. County of Contra Costa, 203 Cal. App. 2d 602, 21 Cal. Rptr. 714
(1962).
"o Faucher v. Sherwood, 321 Mich. 193, 32 N.W.2d 440 (1948); Federal Realty Re-
search Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal, 7 App. Div. 2d 651, 180 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1958);
Richards v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 285 App. Div. 287, 137 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1955); Gold-
berg v. Mackreth, 142 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
The court may also be sympathetic to the variance when a setback has been
imposed for a highway rather than for street widening purposes. In Stout v. Jenkins,
268 S.V.2d 643 (Ky. 1954), an additional thirty foot setback was established to allow
room for the proposed widening of a highway right-of-way. The court affirmed a
variance which allowed the owner to build fourteen feet closer, finding without
discussion that the board had not abused its discretion. See also Appeal of Siddall,
44 Del. County 293 (Pa. C.P.), appeal dismissed, 45 Del. County 38 (Pa. C.P. 1957)
(aesthetic reasons may not be used to object to a variance). But cf. Garden View
Homes, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 137 N.J.L. 44, 57 A.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (vari-
ance cannot be granted simply to permit more profitable use of the property).
17See Goldberg v. Mackreth, supra note 16; Root v. City of Erie Zoning Bd. of
Appeals, 180 Pa. Super. 38, 118 A.2d 297 (1955).
"
8 But cf. Bringle v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765 (1960)
(condition may be attached to use variance requiring dedication of additional right-
of-way for street widening).
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the use of the setback as a highway reservation device. Hardship
problems have already been discussed. Because the setback is most
easily applied to existing streets and highways, its usefulness for
new rights-of-way is limited. Finally, a front yard which is used for
highway widening will be reduced in size and will be nonconform-
ing ,to the zoning ordinance. For this reason, setbacks established
ostensibly for density control but actually for street-widening pur-
poses may be deeper than usual, allowing the courts to detect the
ultra vires application.
II
SUBDIVISION CONTROLS
A. Constitutionality of Dedications and Reservations
Planning enabling acts typically authorize municipal and county
review of new subdivisions. In practice, if not by law, enforcement
is usually limited to residential development. Conformance to the
comprehensive plan for streets is a common requirement, and access
and safety requirements are usually imposed. The developer is re-
quired also to provide streets, and dedication of rights-of-way with-
out compensation has been judicially accepted for both new streets'0
and the widening of streets adjacent to the subdivision.20 Street
construction is contemporaneous with development, however, so that
dedication has little utility as an interim protection device except
as dedications are required for adjacent thoroughfares to take ac-
ount of future traffic needs.
Lack of clarity in the street dedication cases complicates the task
of ascertaining judicial reaction to dedications in contemplation of
future needs, but a clue is provided by the leading California deci-
sion of Ayres v. City Council.21 There a subdivider was required to
dedicate widening strips for an existing street, and the court upheld
the dedication in the following language:
In a growing metropolitan area each additional subdivision adds to the
traffic burden. It is no defense to the conditions imposed in a subdivision
19 Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 111 Aft. 354 (1920); Blevens v. City
of Manchester, 103 N.H. 284, 170 A.2d 121 (1961).
20Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941); Ayres
v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of
Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928). Cf. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9
Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956) (curb and gutter requirement).
21 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
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map proceeding that their fulfillment will incidentally also benefit the
city as a whole. Nor is it a valid objection to say that the conditions
contemplate future as well as more immediate needs. 22
The Ayres opinion suggests that street dedications will be sus-
tained so long as they are proportionate to the highway demand
which the subdivision creates, either presently or in the future, a
point which is underlined by a pair of Illinois cases.23 Special
assessments for street improvements, which are measured by the ex-
tent of the benefit conferred, provide a close analogy. These con-
siderations indicate that outright dedication is of limited use in high-
way programs. Substantial dedications will be required if the subdi-
vision adjoins a throughway, but they will be hard to justify unless
the subdivision is a large one. Difficult problems of administration
will also arise if, as may be the case, a projected expressway is bor-
dered by several subdivisions of small or moderate size. The Ayres
language is helpful, but that case involved a collector street.
An alternative technique2 which has a more explicit interim
function is the reservation of rights-of-way under the subdivision
ordinance. For example, the enabling law for the Maryland-Nation-
21d. at 41, 207 P.2d at 7. The opinion points to special assessment as a useful
analogy. Under special assessment techniques, abutting land is assessed to the extent
that street improvement confers a benefit upon the land affected.
23Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176
N.E.2d 799 (1961); Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d. 448, 167 N.E.2d 230
(1960). These cases invalidated lot fees and land dedications for school purposes,
noting that the need for schools was generated by the entire community and was
not attributable solely to the subdivision. But cf. Blevens v. City of Manchester, 103
N.H. 284, 170 A.2d 121 (1961), upholding regulations which also benefited land-
owners outside the subdivision to which they were applied. The court suggested that
the subdivider might be eligible for hardship relief in this instance.,
2' Of course, any change in land use may generate new traffic, and to this extent
the dedication requirement should not be confined to new subdivisions. To this
effect, see Bringle v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765 (1960), requiring
a street dedication as a condition for a variance permit granted for excavating. One
instructive lesson would seem to be that it is easier to make exactions for streets
when the developer is required to apply for a permit, as is the case under subdivision
and variance provisions. In theory, however, there should be no real difference between
these cases and those in which a change of use occurs as of right under the zoning
ordinance. See Tooke, Methods of Protecting the City Plan in Outlying Districts, 15
GEO. L.J. 127 (1927).
In comparison with setbacks, which may be imposed ad hoc, subdivision controls
also gain strength because they are imposed under a comprehensive plan. The cases
have emphasized this point, Krieger v. Planning Comm'n, 224 Md. 320, 167 A.2d 885
(1961); Blevens v. City of Manchester, supra note 23, and they have not enforced a
street dedication if a plan has not been adopted. Lordship Park Ass'n v. Board of
Zoning Appeals, 137 Conn. 84, 75 A.2d 379 (1950). But cf. Ayres v. City Council, 34
Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949) (subdivision design for district constitutes "practical
adoption" of master plan).
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al Capital Park and Planning Commission authorizes three year
reservations for roads and other public purposes, 25 during which
time the land is exempt from taxation. The reserved land is neither
dedicated to nor immediately acquired by the highway authority;
and even though the lot owner is compensated when the land is
taken for highway purposes, he suffers an uncompensated delay dur-
ing the interim. Because the reserved portion is not counted toward
the lot area requirements of the zoning or subdivision ordinance,
the reservation also amounts to a taking from the developer. Never-
theless, the few cases on point have upheld street reservations under
subdivision regulation as an aid to planning.20 This experience pre-
sents a strong contrast to the official map, whose judicial acceptance
has come much harder.
B. Application in Highway Programs
Several states and communities have carried out an effective
program of interim highway control under subdivision regulations.
One successful agency is the Maryland-National Park and Planning
Commission, with jurisdiction over the two counties on the Mary.
land side of the Washington metropolitan area. Working closely
with the Maryland state highway agency, the commission has mapped
rights-of-way for major highways, many of which run through un-
developed land which is controllable under the subdivision ordi-
nance.27 No development is allowed in the bed of the highway, and
- Md. Laws 1959, ch. 780, § 71 (a) (4), as amended, Md. Laws 1963, ch. 815, § 1.
The reservation may be extended beyond the initial three year period with the
written consent of the owner of the property. For the reservation provisions applicable
in Montgomery County, see Subdivision Regulations for the Maryland-Washington
Regional District Within Montgomery County § 101-13 (Oct. 17, 1961).
20 Krieger v. Planning Comm'n, 224 Md. 320, 167 A.2d 885 (1961). The sub-
division fronted on a state highway sixty feet wide. On the county highway plan, an
ultimate minimum width of one hundred feet was shown. A plat was rejected because
it did not reserve the extra depth necessary to provide for the widening. The court
sustained the planning commission, pointing out that the purpose of the reservation
was to prevent subdivision in the path of a projected or widened highway and that
planning for future needs would be frustrated if compliance with the reservation
could not be enforced. To the court, the basic constitutional issue had been decided
adversely to the subdivider with the earliest cases upholding the constitutionality of
zoning. Accord, Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58
(1928); cf. Clarks Lane Garden Apartments, Inc. v. Schloss, 197 Md. 457, 79 A.2d 538
(1951).
27 The Montgomery County subdivision ordinance defines "subdivision" quite tight-
ly as "the division of a lot, tract, or parcel of land into two or more lots, plots,
sites, tracts, parcels or other divisions." Subdivision Regulations for the Maryland-
Washington Regional District Within Montgomery County § 101-2 (r) (Oct. 17, 1961).
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subdivision developers are asked to dedicate the necessary land for
rights-of-way, although dedication may be combined with reserva-
tion if the exaction is excessive. The property may also be bought
or taken under an option, which freezes acquisition costs as of the
option date. Problems have arisen with the use of reservations be-
cause the enabling act has a three year limit. This period is not
sufficient, and voluntary extensions have been only partially success-
ful. Hardship cases also create difficulties; and while many proper-
ties have been purchased, the absence of a statutory escape only
heightens the danger of a successful challenge. Greensboro, North
Carolina, pursues an equally vigorous program of subdivision con-
trol, again with state cooperation.2 8 Dedications which are twice
the width of city streets are required there for highways, the city
arguing that the subdivision's need for access justifies the more
extensive exaction.
The programs in Greensboro and Maryland are imaginative in
their adaptation of enabling laws which contemplate minimum land
exactions and which are not geared to the more expansive scale of
highway development.29 They are typical, however, in that they are
applied at the local level. Only two states, Wisconsin and Michi-
gan,30 have conferred comprehensive subdivision control authority
upon their state highway agencies. The Wisconsin state highway
In addition, § 101-3 (b) provides that no building permit may be approved for a
structure "unless said structure is to be located on a lot or parcel of land which is
shown on a plot recorded in the Plat Books of the county."
28 This state stands alone in requiring by statute the preparation of local highway
plans in cooperation with the state highway commission. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-66.2
(Supp. 1963).
2 Compare New York's county official map enabling act. It controls subdivisions
along proposed county roads under standards which regulate traffic generating capaci-
ties. N.Y. MUNIC. LAW §§ 239-g to -k. This law apparently has not been implemented
to control the quality of land use along proposed highways. Part of the problem is
a lack of interest on the part of the state highway department. In Westchester
County, traffic and safety requirements have been imposed under the law by rules
and regulations which went into effect in 1958. See Schulman, The County Official
Map Act-A New Tool for County Planning, New York State Planning News, Nov.-Dec.
1958, p. 1. Mr. Schulman is Commissioner of Planning for Westchester County. Cf.
Westchester County Administrative Code, N.Y. Laws 1948, ch. 852, as amended, N.Y.
Laws 1961, ch. 822, § 451 (subdivision plat containing new street connecting with
state or county highway to be referred to county planning board).
"O MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.451, .458, A61, .465-.467 (l) (1953) & 26.459 (Supp. 1963);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 236.12 (2) (a) (Supp. 1963), 236.13 (1) (e) (1957). See also W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 1474(31) (Supp. 1963), authorizing the state highway commission to regu-
late access to subdivisions abutting state highways. For a Canadian statute author-
izing the provincial minister in charge of local government to require dedication
of widening strips, see ONTAIUO RaV. STAT. c. 296, § 28 (5) (c) (1960).
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commission is one of three state agencies to which local authorities
must refer subdivision plats, and the commission's jurisdiction ex-
tends to any subdivision which "abuts or adjoins a state trunk high-
way."31 The statute restricts commission review to existing highways
and makes enforcement dependent upon local cooperation, which
may not be forthcoming. However, the statute confers broad powers
within these limits, authorizing the adoption of rules and regula-
tions for the control of safety and access, and more broadly, "for
the preservation of the public interest and investment in such high-
ways. ' 32 Extensive regulations33 implement access and related con-
,trols3 and take account of future right-of-way needs. Frontage roads
may be required, and the commission may insist "that a frontage
road be set back from the present highway to allow for future
highway improvement."35 While dedication appears to be author-
ized by the statute and regulations, the commission has not required
dedication without the owner's consent on the ground that to do
so would be unconstitutional.
State highway agency review in Michigan is reinforced by the
requirement that all subdivisions must have the approval of the
state auditor general's office as a prerequisite to recording. If the
subdivision includes or affects state or federal aid roads, the auditor
general forwards the plat to the state highway commissioner's office, 80
which examines it to determine whether it conforms to plans on file
for highways and whether it makes adequate provision for traffic
safety 37 While the plans38 show relocated highways as well as widen-
a' Wis. STAT. ANN. § 236.12(2)(a) (Supp. 1963).
82 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 236.13(l)(e) (1957).
s Wis. ADm. CODE (H'ways) §§ 33.01-.12.
8 4 Wis. Aims. CODE (H'ways) § 33.05 (2). The minimum setback is 110 feet, with the
proviso that a local setback ordinance may be substituted if it is equally as restrictive.
35 Wis. ADM. CODE (H'ways) § 33.08(3).
28 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.465 (1953). The auditor general forwards the plat if it
"appears to include lands on state trunkline or federal aid roads, or have endorsed
on same the certificate of the county plat board that the plat affects such roads ......
For the section authorizing county plat board endorsement, see MICH. STAT. ANN. §
26.459 (Supp. 1963). The county plat boards, organized for every county, are outside
the framework of planning law administration. The existence of plat boards in each
county and of equivalent municipal approving agencies is another factor which
contributes to the effectiveness of state review in Michigan.
817 MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26.466 (1953). In addition, all connecting streets and high.
ways must be graded and surfaced in accordance with state highway agency specifica-
tions. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.467(1) (1953). The commissioner's office estimates that
it receives for review about ten per cent of all plats which are processed through the
auditor general.
The Michigan statute also permits county review to determine whether the plat
[Vol. 1964:439
PLANNING THE FREEWAY
ing proposals, they are applied in practice only to existing locations
for which widening is contemplated. The explanation lies in differ-
ences in width. Highways are seldom widened to more than 150
feet, while newly located limited access expressways are at least
double this size. For widenings, dedication of the widening strip
will be required as a condition of plat approval.3 9
C. An Evaluation of Subdivision Controls
The use of subdivision controls for the advance protection of
highway rights-of-way has both strengths and weaknesses. 40 Since the
imposition of these controls depends on the developer's initiative
in seeking approval, regulation will not be effective if subdivision
activity is low or nonexistent. Moreover, subdivision controls can
be most effective in undeveloped rural areas, and it is in these
areas that subdivision regulations are least likely to have been
conforms to any plan for county roads which has been placed on file locally. See
Lefevre v. Houseman-Spitzley Corp., 246 Mich. 383, 224 N.W. 659 (1929) (conformance
to county plan does not violate constitutional provision giving control of streets to
townships; control of streets is distinct from control of highways). Earlier experience
under the Wisconsin and Michigan laws is analyzed in Beuscher, Protection of High-
ways and Feeder Streets Through Subdivision Controls, in HIGHWAY RESEARcH BD.
BULL. No. 101, TRENDS IN LAND AcquisrroN (1955). See also Melli, Subdivision Control
in Wisconsin, 1953 WIs. L. Rnv. 389.
88 At one point the statute appears to require local recording of the highway plan.
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 26.459 (Supp. 1963). However, this requirement has not been
observed in practice.
81 Proposed highway widenings are limited to 150 feet in rural areas, 120 feet in
suburban areas, and 100 feet in urban areas. The order of progression appears re-
versed, since highways should increase in width as they approach urban areas to take
care of the heavier traffic, but the reason behind the order of progression lies in the
higher cost of acquisition in urban areas. Dedication burdens are somewhat lessened
along section-line roads, which have a required width of sixty-six feet. Many local
authorities also impose a seventy-five foot setback from the centerline.
The highway department has also implemented the safety requirement. Points of
access may be changed or reduced in number or a service road may be required.
40 In some instances, the lack of formal policy may injure the administration of
the program. In Michigan, for example, subdividers escape regulation by platting
land in back of that part of the property which abuts on the highway. They then
sell off the abutting lots a few at a time, thus evading the subdivision law, which
defines a subdivision as any tract of five or more lots. However, the Wisconsin
regulations define a "subdivision abutting on a state highway" in fairly broad fashion
to include an area separated from the highway by abutting unplatted lands which
are owned by or under option, contract, or lease to the subdivider. Wis. ADnr. CoDE
(H'ways) § 33.03(3). The discipline of having to establish formal guides for admin-
istration should contribute to the elimination of loopholes of this type. Under its
regulations, the Wisconsin highway commission may also consider the relationship of
the subdivision to adjacent and contiguous land, and it may apply its subdivision con-
trol policies to any contiguous land which is owned by, or under option, contract, or
lease to the subdivider.
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adopted. Even where subdivision controls have been put into effect,
opportunities for evasion through metes and bounds subdividing
and other techniques are always present; and the success of programs
in cities such as Greensboro should not be allowed to hide the whole-
sale evasions which occur elsewhere.
Subdivision controls can still be most useful as a means of com-
pelling highway dedications and reservations, partly because judicial
resistance has been easy to overcome. Analytically, no real difference
exists between a street reservation under an official map ordinance
and a street reservation under a subdivision regulation. Nor is the
act of subdivision the only critical time at which dedication or
reservation should be required. But courts in subdivision cases are
impressed with the argument, erroneous though it may be, that the
subdivider seeking approval is asking for a privilege. This attitude
suggests that the use of a permit requirement in other areas of land
use regulation may facilitate dedications and reservations outside the
context of subdivision control.
III
THE OFFICIAL MAP
A. The Statutory Pattern
The mapping of planned municipal streets is an American prac-
tice which dates from colonial days, when a colonial proprietor
owned all of the land on which a town was to be built and simply
reserved land for street purposes as he sold off individual plots. As
the growth of cities made proprietary methods too cumbersome, city
streets were mapped under fairly primitive official map statutes
adopted at the beginning of the nineteenth century. These laws
contained nothing in the way of enforcement clauses; they did not
authorize variances; and they relied for their effectiveness upon a
provision which denied compensation for any building which was
erected so as to encroach upon the projected street bed. These early
statutes were judicially sustained, and some of the official map laws
still in force in Pennsylvania are modeled on this early legislation.
But changing judicial attitudes led to the invalidation of some of
these laws toward the close of the nineteenth century, and the
change in judicial climate together with the growth of the city plan-
[Vol. 1964:439
PLANNING THE FREEWAY
ning movement led to substantial alteration in the pattern of official
map legislation. 41
In the 1920's and 1930's, official map acts were substantially re-
vised under the influence of model planning laws based on two
basic prototypes which were made available during this period.42
One model derived from the Standard City Planning Enabling Act,
which along with a Standard Zoning Enabling Act was developed by
the United States Department of Commerce. The standard planning
act rests its official map sections upon the eminent domain power.
Under this act, compensation is payable to landowners affected by
the street reservation, although the standards to be applied in de-
termining compensation are not indicated. While this act contains
no enforcement powers and any use can be made of land placed
within the reservation line, no compensation is payable for any
building or structure built within the reserved area.
Although the standard act has been adopted in a few states, local
authorities have either been reluctant or unable to devote public
funds to street reservations and have seldom used it.4 A majority
of the official map acts have followed one of two models of the
second prototype, acts based on the use of the police power rather
than the eminent domain power. These two models were contained
in a 1935 Harvard planning publication.44 These statutes were
drafted by early leaders in the planning movement. One model,
prepared by Edward Bassett and Frank Williams, was derived from
a similar statute they had drafted for enactment in New York in
1926. The other statute was prepared by Alfred Bettman. While
substantially alike in principle, the Bassett-Williams and Bettman
2 The classic treatment of official map laws in Kucirek & Beuscher, Wisconsin's
Official Map Law: Its Current Popularity and Implications for Conveyancing and
Platting, 1957 Wis. L. REv. 176. It should be consulted for a thorough treatment of
the development of the mapping device and the early cases on the constitutionality
of official map statutes.
42 The model legislation is reproduced in BLACK, op. cit. supra note 5, at 177-86.
3 This conclusion was reached in a recent survey of the use of official map enabling
legislation in the United States. Davis, Official Maps and Mapped Streets in the
United States, July, 1960 (unpublished thesis in Georgia Institute of Technology
Library).
11 BASSETr, WILLIAMS, BETTMIAN & WRITTEN, MODEL LA5vs FOR PLANNING CITIES,
COUNTIES, AND STATEs (1935). Whitten contributed to the discussion but did not
append a model law. Bettman, and also Bassett and Williams, drafted enabling laws
for both counties and municipalities. The Bassett-Williams and Bettman models are
compared in greater detail in BLAcK, op. cit. supra note 5, at 18-22.
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models differ significantly in detail, and the state enabling acts show
the influence of one or the other.
Both the standard planning act and the Bettman police power
model require a comprehensive street plan as a prerequisite to an
official map, while the plan requirement is not explicit in the Bas-
sett-Williams model. The standard act contemplates a series of indi-
vidual street reservations to be shown on plats, while the police
power models provide for a single map which is subject to periodic
amendment.
Neither of the police power models denies compensation for
buildings or structures built in the bed of a street, but they rely for
enforcement on a permit procedure under which no permit is issued
except in hardship cases. Hardship is defined differently in the two
acts. Bettman requires that the property of which the mapped street
forms a part be incapable of yielding a reasonable return, or that,
balancing the interests of the municipality against the interests of
the owner, considerations of "justice and equity" dictate the grant
of a permit. Bassett and Williams authorize a permit if the land
"within" the mapped street is not earning a fair return. This test
is acknowledged as more conservative than Bettman's; and it appears
easy to satisfy, since no use may be made of the restricted portion
and a fair return can never be earned if only that part of the parcel
is considered. Both models authorize conditions on the grant of a
variance. Bassett and Williams authorize "reasonable conditions"
designed to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the communi-
ty, while Bettman authorizes specific conditions covering both the
character and the duration of the development. The discussion will
concentrate on official map enabling laws modeled after the police
power provisions of the Bassett-Williams and Bettman drafts,45 which
now have been adopted in more than half of the states.
5 See also Symonds v. Bucklin, 197 F. Supp. 682 (D. Md. 1961). The court upheld
the constitutionality of a Montgomery County, Maryland, zoning ordinance which
had incorporated the Bettman official map permit and variance provisions. Mont-
gomery County's authority to enact these provisions as part of its zoning ordinance
was not challenged.
One defect in both the police power models is that the variance procedure applies
only to new buildings proposed to be erected in the bed of a mapped street. Nothing
is said about alterations to or reconstructions of existing buildings, an important
problem in developed areas. The inference is that changes in existing buildings are
either prohibited absolutely or are exempt from the permit provisions of the law.
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B. The Constitutional Issues
Official map laws confer clear advantages on highway agencies.
What are the disadvantages to the landowner? One problem is that
the acquisition of his property will be delayed, yet no improvements
will be permitted in the interim. Another is that the measure of
compensation when his land is taken may be adversely affected by
the highway reservation. How will these effects influence judicial
reaction to official map laws?
1. The Temporary Freeze
An Arizona case suggests that the eminent domain power may
not be manipulated to freeze the status quo of the condemnee's
property for a substantial period of time pending condemnation.
State ex rel. Willey v. Griggs46 held unconstitutional an Arizona law
which attempted to accomplish through eminent domain procedures
what the official map law accomplishes under the police power.
Under the Arizona law, the value of the affected property was fixed
as of the filing of the highway department's resolution of necessity.
The department had two years after this date to complete the taking,
"and improvements placed upon such property subsequent to the
date of such resolution... [were not to] be included in the assess-
ment of compensation and damages." 47 What struck the court as
objectionable was the fact that for two years after the filing of the
resolution, the property owner acted at his peril, although the state
was not required to proceed with the condemnation. If it dropped
the proceedings, no compensation was allowed for the intervening
inconvenience.48 That the statute permitted the state to save money
" 89 Ariz. 70, 358 P.2d 174 (1960).
4 Under Arizona procedure, the value of the property is fixed as of the date of
the summons in the condemnation action. In this case, the property had increased
in value by $5000 in the seven month period between the resolution of necessity and
the summons date. Opening Brief for Appellant, p. 6, State ex rel. Willey v. Griggs,
supra note 46. In its appellate brief, the highway department argued the case prind-
pally on the point that the purpose of the statute was to prevent the inflation in
real estate values which usually results from the announcement of a highway project.
The brief noted that a majority of decisions have "denied the owner the right to
recover an increase or enhancement in the value of the land due to the proposed
improvement." Id. at p. 8.
8 In the converse situation, when entry precedes the taking, the state may be
liable for temporary occupation if it abandons the proceeding without completing it.
Andrews v. State, 19 Misc. 2d 217, 188 N.Y.S.2d 854 (Ct. Cl. 1959), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d
606, 176 N.E.2d 42 (1961); Robert S. Smith Corp. v. State, 31 Misc. 2d 107, 49 N.Y.S.2d
579 (Ct. Cl. 1944).
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did not convince the court that so drastic an interference with pri-
vate rights in land was justified.
A similar statute has been upheld elsewhere,49 and the Griggs
rationale goes contrary to the usual rule that no liability attaches
for the abandonment of condemnation proceedings or for a delay
in prosecution, unless the delay is either unreasonable or a deliber-
ate attempt to depreciate the value of the condemnee's property. 0
Even more in point are cases holding that damages cannot be re-
covered for depreciation in market value due to delay in filing con-
demnation proceedings which have been kept under consideration
for some time.51
At first glance, what seems most important is the manipulation
of labels. Ordinarily, no liability attaches for public inaction. If
the property owner voluntarily complies with a state or municipal
request to adjust his plans to a proposed highway or street project,
the court will not find a taking.52 But liability will attach if the
public authority intentionally undertakes a course of action which
will result in delay and injury to him and to which the landowner
does not consent. This disability was found to be the vice of the
statute which was held unconstitutional in the Griggs case, since it
provided for a maximum planned delay of two years. Yet these
distinctions may be illusory to the landowner. He may be as much
affected by the mere announcement of a highway project as he is
by the filing of condemnation proceedings, and the burden of litiga-
tion may effectively compel voluntary adjustments which are treated
as noncompensatory.
The problems lie in the borderland between police power and
eminent domain. Perhaps the Griggs statute was found objection-
"1 Drainage Dist. v. Chicago B. 8, Q. R.R., 96 Neb. 1, 146 N.W. 1055 (1914) (statute
permitted two year delay in completion of proceedings). But cf. Chelten Trust Co. v.
Blankenburg, 241 Pa. 394, 88 Ad. 664 (1913).
1" For a discussion of the problems of delay and abandonment in condemnation,
:see Lord Calvert Theatre v. Mayor and City Council, 208 Md. 606, 119 A.2d 415 (1956).
"I United States v. Certain Lands in Town of Highlands, 47 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y.
1942); A. Gettelman Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 245 Wis. 9, 13 N.W.2d 541
.(1944). The problem is discussed in Congressional School of Aeronautics, Inc. v. State
Roads Comm'n, 218 Md. 236, 146 A.2d 558 (1958).
52 Hamer v. State Highway Comm'n, 304 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1957). The state aban-
doned the project after the property owner had complied; a suit for damages was
dismissed. Cf. State v. Hankins, 63 N.J. Super. 326, 164 A.2d 615 (App. Div. 1960)
(gas pumps voluntarily set back from state highway); Devlin v. City of Philadelphia,
!206 Pa. 518, 56 At. 21 (1903) (change of grade case); Widening of Venango Street, 9
Pa. Dist. 651 (Q.S. 1900) (street widening law did not compel setback).
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able because it imposed an unreasonable limitation on land use.
The zoning ordinance, and not the eminent domain proceeding, is
the proper place to impose land use limitations; and zoning ordi-
nances may well be drafted with delay in mind. A common example
is an ordinance which limits fringe development by temporary resi-
dential zoning or by other means. Provided the time limit is reason-
able, the courts will be favorably disposed toward delay.53 Griggs
may simply stand for the proposition that eminent domain cannot
be used to accomplish what should be undertaken under the police
power. But the reasoning can become circular. Equally well-estab-
lished is the proposition that police power zoning cannot be used to
accomplish what should be undertaken by way of eminent domain
proceedings. For example, a municipality may zone a parcel located
in a residential area for industrial purposes to prevent its develop-
ment prior to the time it can be acquired for a park, but all courts,
applying the Griggs rationale, would agree that a zoning ordinance
may not be used to reduce acquisition costs by preventing the
interim development of privately held land.54
The fate of zoning ordinances which forestall private develop-
ment raises additional doubt about the constitutionality of official
map laws. What really distinguishes the zoning cases, however, is
not so much the abuse of the zoning power but the discriminatory
treatment of individual property owners. This impression is rein-
forced by cases in which the dispensing power, in the form of a
requested building permit or variance, is withheld solely because of
an ad hoc decision to reserve land for a highway. In all of these
cases, the municipal action has been reversed. A good example is
Grosso v. Board of Adjustment,55 in which an application had been
"3 See the important case of Metro Realty v. County of El Dorado, 35 Cal. Rptr.
480 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963), upholding a zoning ordinance imposing a three year reserva-
tion of private property which had been designated through advance planning for
the acquisition of water reservoir sites. Compare Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher,
278 N.Y. 222, 232, 15 N.E.2d 587, 592 (1938).
" 2700 Irving Park Bldg. Corp. v. City of Chicago, 395 Ill. 138, 69 N.E.2d 827
(1946) (property in industrial area zoned to apartment use to prevent development
of park site); Grand Trunk Western Ry. v. City of Detroit, 326 Mich. 387, 40 N.W.2d
195 (1949) (similar facts); City of Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex, 69 N.J. Super.
136, 173 A.2d 785 (L. 1961) (park site zoned for "school or park" purposes); Chase
v. City of Glen Cove, 34 Misc. 2d 810, 227 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (privately
owned tract rezoned for public housing development); State ex rel. Tingley v. Gurda,
209 Wis. 63, 243 N.V. 317 (1932) (land in industrial area, intended for boulevard,
zoned residential). Cf. Hager v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning
Comm'n, 261 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1953).
"; 137 N.J.L. 630, 61 A.2d 167 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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filed for a variance. Before a decision had been reached, the official
map was amended to cover the applicant's property and the permit
was then denied. On appeal, the denial was reversed. Similar re-
sults have been reached when the zoning power has been used retro-
actively in the same way.56 Whether the result would be as unfavor-
able if the limitation on development had been imposed consider-
ably in advance and in accordance with a comprehensive plan is
surely open to question.
2. The Measure of Compensation
Equally as difficult is the problem of valuing land reserved for
the highway when it is finally acquired for a right-of-way. Clearly
the landowner will not be awarded a nominal or zero value for his
property simply because under the official map the land is available
only for public and not for private uses.5 7 A milder form of the
nominal value approach has also been rejected. In one case the
condemning agency argued that the market value should reflect the
limited time, prior to the taking, during which the land could be
used for private development. 58 These decisions reflect the familiar
rule that depreciation attributable to the project for which the land
is taken may not be considered when compensation in awarded.50
Enhancement in value which is traceable to the taking is also dis-
'0 State ex rel. Dille Labs. Corp. v. Woditsch, 106 Ohio App. 541, 156 N.E.2d
164 (1958) (refusal of building permit); Henle v. City of Euclid, 97 Ohio App. 258,
125 N.E.2d 355, appeal dismissed, 162 Ohio St. 280, 122 N.E.2d 792 (1954) (refusal of
rezoning). Cf. Roer Constr. Corp. v. City of New Rochelle, 207 Misc. 46, 136 N.Y.S.2d
414 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (retroactive application of official map).
7 Congressional School of Aeronautics, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, 218 Md. 236,
146 A.2d 558 (1958). South Twelfth Street, 217 Pa. 362, 66 At. 568 (1907); Re Gibson
and City of Toronto, 28 Ont. L.R. 20, 11 D.L.R. 529 (CA. 1913). Compare Rogers
v. State Roads Comm'n, 227 Md. 560, 177 A.2d 850 (1962) (covenant limiting use
reduces value of land).
8Congressional School of Aeronautics, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, supra note 57.
The principle is well-established by a pair of contrasting United States Supreme
Court cases. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961) (de-
preciation); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943) (enhancement). See also the
cases collected in 4 NicHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.3151 (4th ed. 1962); Annot., 147
A.L.R. 66 (1943). Cf. City of Dallas v. Shackelford, 200 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App.
1946) (A.L.R. incorrect in suggesting that Texas follows minority view). Practically
all of the state courts which have decided the question follow the federal rule. For
particularly interesting recent applications, see Brubaker v. State, 27 Misc. 2d 458,
214 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (St. Lawrence River improvement projects); In the
Matter of Addition to Lincoln Square Urban Renewal Project, 22 Misc. 2d 619, 198
N.Y.S.2d 248 (Sup. Ct.), motion for reconsideration denied, 23 Misc. 2d 690, 199
N.Y.S.2d 225 (Sup. Ct. 1960). For discussion of date of valuation problems in eminent
domain, see Comment, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 319 (1963).
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regarded.60 Official map legislation has avoided these problems by
not dealing with them, and the pitfalls inherent in legislative treat-
ment are illustrated by the statute held unconstitutional in the
Griggs case. Under that law the landowner was deprived of all in-
crement to the value of his land which accrued subsequent to the
resolution of necessity. The courts allow the landowner to collect
any increment in value due to general conditions not related to the
project for which the property is acquired, even though govern-
mental policies may affect those conditions;61 and this increment
was denied to the landowner under the Griggs statute.
During the interim period prior to acquisition, potential losses
in the use and development of the restricted property must also be
considered. If the land is undeveloped, the property owner will be
prevented from developing it to a more profitable use; and he will
lose any interim profits which might have been earned. In this
situation the landowner suffers a loss on a use which is not in being
at the time the property is restricted. The loss is not compensable
because only vested rights62 in land are protected from a retroactive
application of the police power.63
60 For cases applying the enhancement rule to highway takings, see Territory of
Hawaii v. American Sec. Bank, 43 Hawaii 167 (1959); Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 338
Mass. 661, 157 N.E.2d 209 (1959); Benton v. Town of Brookline, 151 Mass. 250, 23
N.E. 846 (1890); In the Matter of Throgs Neck Expressway, 16 App. Div. 2d 570, 229
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1962). These and other cases indicate quite dearly that the date on
which the official map is effective can be taken as the date after which enhancement
due to the project can be disregarded. See also United States v. Miller, supra note 59
(dam project); May v. City of Boston, 158 Mass. 21, 32 N.E. 902 (1893) (park). In
both cases, enhancement between the date of authorization and the time of taking
was disallowed.
Most courts will discount enhancement (and depreciation) only after the project
has been definitely located. Other cases, however, will go back to the beginning of
the project, even though at this time there was only a general expectation that the
project would be completed. Annot., 147 A.L.R. 66, 68 (1943). A Massachusetts
statute which had been so interpreted may have been changed by a recent amend-
ment. Connor v. Metropolitan Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 314 Mass. 3, 49 N.E.2d
598 (1943); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 79, § 12 (Supp. 1962) (damages to be fixed at value
"before the recording" of the order of taking).
11 See, e.g., Iriarte v. United States, 157 F.2d 105 (1st Cir. 1946) (general govern-
mental policy to dredge harbors admissible to show that harbor tract could be used
for industrial development). Cf. In the Matter of Widening of Wall-Street, 17 Barb.
617, 689 (N.Y. 1854).
12A good recent example is State ex rel. Mar-Well, Inc. v. Dodge, 118 Ohio App.
118, 177 N.E.2d 515 (1960), holding that the mere filing of a subdivision plat is not
enough of a change in land use to confer a vested right. Otherwise, said the court,
a claim of use could be based upon hope rather than occupancy and beneficial enjoy-
ment.
13 However, in State v. Corey, 59 Wash. 2d 98, 866 P.2d 185 (1961), the state
stipulated to $4000 in damages alleged to have been caused by a highway reservation.
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The highway reservation may likewise affect the rate of return
on improved property located in the right-of-way which is noncon-
forming to the highway reservation. Repairs and alterations may
be forbidden under the statute; but even if no such prohibition
exists, the owner of the property may be reluctant to undertake
improvements. Deterioration may then affect the rate of return.
Nevertheless, under traditional rules a loss of business profits is not
compensable when the property is acquired. Some courts, therefore,
suggest that the highway reservation is invalid for this reason 04
Statutory recognition of interim business losses might help avoid an
unfavorable judicial decision, a point which contemporary official
map legislation does not consider. The trouble is that business losses
are highly speculative and may not be solely attributable to the
highway reservation. Some formula must be found to isolate the
loss which is attributable to the highway reservation.0 5
The facts of the case are not given in the opinion, but damages were based on loss
of rental value from inability to develop the land to its highest use. Letter From
Edward E. Level, Assistant Attorney General, State of Washington, July 30, 1962.
0, In addition to State ex rel. Willey v. Griggs, 89 Ariz. 70, 358 P.2d 174 (1960),
see Sansom Street, 293 Pa. 483, 143 At. 134 (1928). Compare Dong v. State ex rel.
Willey, 90 Ariz. 148, 367 P.2d 202 (1961) (state not liable for intervening vandalism).
e Additional loss may occur if the highway reservation is terminated without com-
pletion of the project. The property owner may postpone development because of
the anticipated highway, or he may voluntarily adjust his building plans, perhaps
leaving part of his property unused in the expectation that it will be acquired. No
right to compensation has accrued to the property owner in these cases, since he
cannot acquire a vested right in an uncertainty. A landowner undertaking substantial
improvements in reliance upon a zoning classification will be protected if the zoning
ordinance is changed before his improvement has been completed. But in this case
the landowner is merely trying to prevent the alteration of a public decision which
has already been made. If the official map is changed, the landowner who claims
reliance is attempting to force a public decision (to acquire) which has not yet been
taken. Moreover, in the zoning example just given, he does not try to seek damages
for injury arising out of the exercise of a governmental function.
A good analogy is Kirschke v. City of Houston, 330 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 474 (1960). The city refused to issue a building
permit for construction on land which was needed for highway purposes. The property
owner sued for damages, but his suit was dismissed. Since the refusal to issue a
building permit was held to involve the exercise of a governmental function, the city
incurred no liability.
An early case in which a change was made in a setback line after compliance by
the property owner had been compelled lends strong support to this analysis. Nusbaum
v. City of Norfolk, 151 Va. 801, 145 S.E. 257 (1928). After the city compelled the
plaintiff to set his building back five feet, it repealed the building line and did not
impose the same requirement on another building in the same block. An action to
force the new building to build out to the repealed building line was dismissed. In
one situation, however, a statutory adjustment might be required on equitable grounds.
Interim losses from established businesses should be compensable if the official map
is terminated, even though no constitutional claim to compensation exists in these cases.
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C. The Constitutionality of Official Map Laws
While several cases decided in the latter part of the nineteenth
century held the official map laws of that period unconstitutional,
the changes made in adapting these statutes to modem planning
legislation have led to a shift in judicial attitude. However, official
map acts have not met the problems of delay and measure of com-
pensation through explicit provision. Few of these laws contain
absolute limits on the duration of the official map restriction, and
none have attempted to resolve the compensation questions. In-
stead, they have met constitutional objections by utilizing the
Bassett-Williams and Bettman hardship variances to make adjust-
ments in burdensome cases. As a result, no court in the last fifty years
has held an official map law unconstitutional when it has been applied
to streets and highways.66
A good example is provided by the history of map legislation in
New York. Following an early decision upholding the nineteenth
century map law,67 the Court of Appeals held the statute unconstitu-
tional in Forster v. Scott.6s There the official map covered all of the
lot, a fact which heavily influenced the decision. The statute denied
compensation for any building placed in the bed of a mapped street
and contained no variance provision, a combination of restrictions
which also contributed to the result. After the Forster decision,
the Bassett-Williams version of the official map law was adopted;
its variance provision was inserted; and the section denying compen-
sation was removed. In Headley v. City of Rochester,69 the new
version of the act was sustained by the highest court, which found
that the official map was necessary to protect the integrity of future
streets. Hardship cases, it was noted, could be handled by the vari-
ance clause. In this case, no application for a variance had been
0 Symonds v. Bucklin, 197 F. Supp. 682 (D. Md. 1961); Headley v. City of
Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936); State ex rel. Miller v. Manders, 2 Wis.
2d 865, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957). In Congressional School of Aeronautics, Inc. v. State
Roads Comm'n, 218 Md. 236, 146 A.2d 558 (1958), the court did not decide the
question, but it reviewed the Manders and Headley cases and suggested that the
official map act would be held constitutional. In Pennsylvania, the constitutionality
of the map device has long been established. See Hinaman v. Vandergrift, 197 Pa.
Super. 140, 177 A.2d 174 (1962) (state highway reservation law); In the Matter of
Pittsburgh, 2 W. & S. 320 (Pa. 1841).
7 In the Matter of Furman Street, 17 Wend. 649 (N.Y. 1836).
0s 186 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893).
09 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936).
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made; and unlike Forster, the lot owner was left the major portion
of his lot on which he could build.
While Headley may be explained on the narrow procedural
ground that the landowner challenging the statute had not first ap-
plied for a variance, 70 the case stands for more than just that point.
State ex rel. Miller v. Manders,7' a case upholding the Wisconsin
official map law, sharpens the issues considerably. In that case almost
ninety per cent of the landowner's available frontage had been
placed in the bed of a proposed street. The Wisconsin court first
approved the planning objective of the statute, noting that "the
constitution will accommodate a wide range of community-planning
devices to meet the pressing problems of community growth, dete-
rioration, and change."72 Ad hoc approaches were distinguished.78
The court then held that the correct procedure was to request a
variance and, if denied, to seek court review by means of certiorari.
What the Headley and Manders cases mean is that an official map
act will be insulated from constitutional attack if the court insists
upon the exhaustion doctrine. Following the trend set in zoning
litigation, the courts approve the official map in principle, relegating
allegations of substantial damage to administrative relief by way of
the variance procedure. The Manders case took this approach 74 even
though the court hinted there that the substantial restriction placed
on the lot presented an appropriate case for administrative relief.75
70 Cf. Petterson v. Redspi Realty & Coal Corp., 264 App. Div. 903, 35 N.Y.S.2d 797
(1942) (dissenting opinion).
712 Wis. 2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957).
'12 Id. at 370-71, 86 N.W.2d at 472-73. See also the cases in which the municipality
establishes a change in the grade of a street but delays making the actual change for
several years. No compensation is payable to lotowners who, in the meantime, build
to the old grade and are left sitting either high or low when the actual change is
finally made. Kuhl v. City of Philadelphia, 15 Pa. D. & C. 617 (C.P. 1931); 2 NicioLs,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.13[3] (3d ed. 1950).
"'The court dismissed an earlier Wisconsin decision which had overturned a
zoning ordinance passed to depress property values in contemplation of a projected
new boulevard. It found no "motive" to depress property values in the official map
law and also noted that the zoning ordinance had contained no hardship variance
provisions. 2 Wis. 2d 365, 376, 86 N.W.2d 469, 475 (1957).
"Accord, Vangellow v. City of Rochester, 190 Misc. 128, 71 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct.
1947).7 A final subsidiary point is left undecided by these opinions. Under the Bassett-
Williams model of the official map act, adopted both in New York and Wisconsin,
the statute does not deny compensation to buildings placed in the bed of an unopened
street. A provision to this effect has been inserted in that part of the Wisconsin
law which is applicable to extraterritorial extensions of the map, but it was not
involved in the Manders decision. The problem is not a difficult one as a matter of
statutory construction, since a building erected without a permit would appear to be
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D. Problems of Administration
In spite of their long history, official maps are used infrequently
even today. A recent nationwide survey found official maps in 170
communities in ten states, but practically all of these communities
were concentrated in California, New Jersey, and Wisconsin.76 In
these communities, most of the administrative problems revolve
around the issuance of hardship variances. All of the available evi-
dence suggests that hardship variances are seldom granted. A survey
of forty-one communities indicated that two thirds had given no vari-
ances at all,77 and most of the variances which were granted were
for temporary structures or minor improvements.
Cases on the administration of official map variances are scarce,
however, and clues to possible judicial reaction must be derived
largely from the law governing variances under analogous zoning
and planning controls. An initial and primary question is whether
the hardship required to be proved under an official map variance
must be unique. Application of this rule would curtail hardship
variances substantially because in most instances all properties are
equally restricted by the official map.
While authority under related legislation indicates that a unique-
ness requirement may not be applicable,78 the zoning cases may be
an illegal structure and removable as such. Forbes Street, 70 Pa. 125 (1871). This
argument is convincingly put by Kucirek & Beuscher, supra note 41, at 193. Cf. Bibber
v. Weber, 199 Misc. 906, 102 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 278 App. Div. 973, 105
N.Y.S.2d 758 (1951). The Headley case relied upon the absence of such a clause in
dismissing the challenge to the New York law. Cf. In the Matter of Southern Blvd., 262
App. Div. 263, 28 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1941), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 874, 59 N.E.2d 783 (1944), sug-
gesting that the law would be unconstitutional if it denied compensation for a build-
ing erected in the bed of a street without a permit. Only in Pennsylvania has a
denial of compensation clause been sustained. Hinaman v. Vandergrift, 197 Pa. Super.
140, 177 A.2d 174 (1962); Harrison's Estate, 250 Pa. 129, 95 At. 406 (1915). See Bentz
v. Commonwealth, 75 York L. Rec. 190 (Pa. C.P. 1962). Here the building encroached
two feet on the reserved right-of-way, and the court ordered that damages be reduced
proportionately. The removal by injunction analogy should be helpful here. In-
junctive relief would clearly be available to remove an offending structure erected
without a permit, and denial of compensation is equally as reasonable as a penalty.
70 Davis, supra note 43, at 23. This count excludes Pennsylvania, in which official
maps are noted for "all third class" cities, a report which requires further checking
in view of possible misunderstandings about the nature of official maps which may
have inflated the Davis figures. See also Euclide, Green Bay's Experience with an
Oflicial Map, The Municipality, March, 1960, p. 70.
77 Davis, supra note 43, at 28, 29; Kucrek & Beuscher, supra note 41, at 193-200.
78 Phillips v. Westfield Bd. of Adjustment, 41 N.J. Super. 549, 125 A.2d 562 (L.
1956), rev'd, 44 N.J. Super. 491, 130 A.2d 866 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 24 N.J.
465, 132 A.2d 558 (1957); cf. Jenckes v. Building Comm'r, 341 Mass. 162, 167 N.E.2d
757 (1960).
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more relevant. Uniqueness is a prerequisite for the granting of a
zoning variance, on the theory that alterations required by general
conditions demand legislative intervention. Like a zoning variance,
an official map variance is an intrusion upon the legislative scheme,
so that the same rules may apply. So far the uniqueness issue has
not been directly litigated in the official map cases, although the
courts have proceeded on the assumption that uniqueness is not an
element to be considered. Attention has focused instead upon the
financial plight of an individual lotowner, specifically upon whether
it is shared by individuals in similar circumstances in the same
vicinity.
A satisfactory judicial definition of the commonly used "fair re-
turn" standard has also been slow to evolve. A New York trial court
has held that the owner must be permitted to put his land to its
"most profitable" use,79 a suggestion which is not in keeping with
the usual assumption that no variance is required if the land can
be put to a reasonably profitable use. A final consideration is that
the fair return standard is almost impossible to apply to residential
property.
Conditions may be imposed on official map variances in order
to minimize the effect of the nonconforming structure upon the
mapped street. Some municipalities have experimented successfully
with a restriction to temporary structures,80 removable at the own-
er's expense. Another helpful device has been the use of an amorti-
zation formula, which places a life expectancy on the improvement
allowed by the permit and reduces acquisition costs proportionately
by the length of this period which has expired prior to the taking.
Hovever, this technique is of limited usefulness as applied to sub-
stantial structures with a lengthy life span.81
A review of two common situations in which variances have been
approved may help to illustrate the variance problem. 82
7 Vangellow v. City of Rochester, 190 Misc. 128, 71 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
Cf. S. S. Kresge Co. v. City of New York, 194 Misc. 645, 87 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 275 App. Div. 1036, 92 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1949) (lessee may be entitled to variance
although lessor derives fair return from property because of a long-term lease).
80 See Kucirek 9: Beuscher, supra note 41, at 198-200, comparing practices in New
York and Wisconsin municipalities. They discuss Vangellow v. City of Rochester,
supra note 79, which suggests a condition similar to that described in the text.
"'See Rand v. City of New York, 3 Misc. 2d 769, 155 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 1956),
holding that a ten year amortization period was too short for a building with' a
fifty year life expectancy.
82 The discussion that follows is based on cases which have:
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1. Substantial or Total Restriction of the Lot
Variances are freely given in these cases, suggesting that financial
hardship to the owner is the guiding spirit behind the variance
clause. The difficulties arise in application. When all of the lot is
affected, the courts have no difficulty in approving a variance.83 A
similar case is presented by the "key" or corner lot. When street
reservations are imposed on both streets at an intersection, building
on the remaining lot area may be impossible. As in the setback
cases, a variance will follow.8 4 On the other hand, the cases are less
certain in intermediate situations, although the percentage of the
lot which is restricted may be less important than the total impact
of the restriction upon the entire property.85 Of course, under the
Bassett-Williams model, the board is only to ascertain the effect of
the official map on that portion of the tract within the mapped
street, a concession even more favorable to the landowner.8 6
1) passed on an application for a variance; or
2) passed on a claim that the street reservation is unconstitutional as applied to
the lot in question; or
3) passed on a claim, brought forward in an inverse condemnation proceeding,
that the municipality is liable in damages for having imposed the street reservation.
What is to be stressed here is the interlocking nature of all three approaches to
relief, both in terms of the result to the landowner and the underlying legal concept.
A case in which a variance would be allowable under a denial of fair return standard
is also a case in which the application of the reservation would be unreasonable on
constitutional grounds. It is also a case in which the municipality might be forced
to pay damages, on the ground that the police power has imposed a confiscatory
restriction which calls instead for the use of the power of eminent domain. The
cases on inverse condemnation are drawn from Pennsylvania, where property owners
may rely on a statute which authorizes the appointment of a board to assess damages
against the municipality for restrictions found to be unreasonable. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, §§ 1081-94 (1957). This is a useful technique which might be extended and
which will come in for more discussion later.
8ORoer Constr. Corp. v. City of New Rochelle, 207 Misc. 46, 136 N.Y.S.2d 414
(Sup. Ct. 1954) (lotowner had applied for permit and was refused; map held un-
reasonable as applied to his property).
84 See the following cases in which the Pennsylvania procedures were used to claim
compensation in this kind of situation: Sansom Street, 293 Pa. 843, 143 At. 134 (1928)
(three foot frontage); Crilly Petition, 18 Lehigh LJ. 302 (Pa. C.P. 1939) (eight feet).
85 Symonds v. Bucklin, 197 F. Supp. 682 (D. Md. 1961) (although 26% of lot was
restricted, reservation upheld because reasonable return on property could be obtained
through construction of building within approved limits). Cf. Del Vecchio v. Tuomey,
283 App. Div. 955, 130 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1954), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 749, 125 N.E.2d 107 (1955)
(variance approved which decreased reservation strip on corner lot from twelve and
one-half to ten feet).
86 For cases interpreting this language in the New York statute, see 59 Front St.
Realty Corp. v. Klaess, 6 Misc. 2d 774, 160 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Vangellow
v. City of Rochester, 190 Misc. 128, 71 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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2. Restrictions on Existing Buildings
While any structure in existence when the official map is adopted
must be paid for when the property is acquired,87 a more difficult
question is the extent to which the official map may preserve the
status quo. Some cases indicate that the owner's right to rebuild or
make alterations cannot be restricted, and therefore they allow vari-
ances for these purposes.88 This attitude toward existing buildings
contrasts with the approach to nonconforming structures under
zoning ordinances. Because zoning ordinances usually rest upon the
premise that nonconforming structures will eventually disappear,
alteration and reconstruction are severely limited; and these restric-
tions have been sustained.89 Under official map laws, however, the
cases have assumed that the property owner has the right to a normal
return on existing structures during the period prior to condemna-
tion. This attitude has been influenced by the judicial refusal to
compensate the landowner for his loss of profits in the condemna-
tion proceeding.
Whether a difference exists between a use which is nonconform-
ing to a zoning ordinance and one which is nonconforming to an
official map is open to question. One point of difference is that a
use under the official map law is nonconforming only in terms of
the proposed highway, not in terms of incompatibility with other
hses in the surrounding area. The position of the nonconforming
use under official map laws has not been fully litigated, but the
courts have been sensitive to any attempt to depress property values
in advance of condemnation.
E. An Evaluation of Official Maps
In recent decisions courts have sustained the official map device
as a temporary prohibititon upon the development of land in a
. McGrath v. City of Waterbury, 111 Conn. 237, 149 Atl. 783 (1930); The Widen-
ing of Chestnut Street, 118 Pa. 593, 12 Ad. 585 (1888). Cf. D. W. Winkelman Co. v.
State, 17 Misc. 2d 418, 184 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Ct. Cl. 1959), modified, 10 App. Div. 2d 894,
199 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1960).
88 Sansom Street, 293 Pa. 483, 143 AtI. 184 (1928); Philadelphia Parkway, 250 Pa.
57, 95 Ati. 429 (1915); City of Philadelphia v. Linnard, 97 Pa. 242 (1881) (compensa-
tion payable when building rebuilt back to building line and left in recess between
adjoining buildings). Cf. Del Vecchio v. Tuomey, 283 App. Div. 955, 130 N.Y.S.2d
481 (1954), aff'd, 808 N.Y. 749, 125 N.E.2d 107 (1955) (partial variance to permit
conformance to adjacent buildings). See also French v. Cooper, 133 NJ.L. 246, 43 A.2d
880 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (de minimis; awning may extend over building line).
88 Selligman v. Von Allmen Bros., 297, Ky. 121, 179 S.W.2d 207 (1944). See Com-
ment, The Elimination of Non-Conforming Uses, 1951 Wis. L. Rxv. 685.
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projected right-of-way. Relying upon the availability of hardship
variances, the cases have employed the exhaustion doctrine to shield
official map laws from broadside attack. Contrary to expectations,
little attention has been paid to the time limit during which an
official map may be effective. Few statutes contain a time limit, and
the few cases on the point are inconclusive. In the context of the
Griggs case, two years could not be upheld. Elsewhere, a five year
limit has been approved.90 Certainly ten years would be too much.91
It would seem that the courts are more concerned with the avail-
ability of escape mechanisms when real hardship occurs than with
the use of an absolute time limit as a guarantee against unreason-
able deprivations.
On balance, the official map is a helpful reservation device with
some important qualifications. Like the setback, its usefulness in
developed areas is limited. The mapping device is also vulnerable
if the projected right-of-way cuts too deeply into individual lots.
By far the most serious limitation on the official map is the hardship
variance procedure. Although the hardship variance has not yet
created difficulties in administration, the statutory framework is
potentially troublesome. Hardship provisions are owner-oriented,
and they may encourage pressure for encroachment. The utility of
conditioning the grant of a variance is questionable, partly because
property owners may successfully object and partly because the
temporary, groundfloor removable structure has a habit of growing
roots.
Most important, the variance procedure is self-defeating. Part
of the purpose of the official map law is to limit acquisition costs;
but the structure permitted as a variance is a licensed encroachment,
for which payment will have to be made at some future date. Ob-
servers have already noted that several communities will purchase
00 Philadelphia Parkway Opening, 295 Pa. 538, 145 At. 600 (1929). The decision
rejected an earlier case which suggested that a landowner whose property lay in the
path of the parkway could force acquisition of his property if the city had taken
unequivocal steps toward completion of the highway. Philadelphia Parkway, 250 Pa.
257, 95 Atl. 429 (1915). See Note, 13 U. Prrr. L. REv. 553 (1952).
01 Cook v. Di Domenico, 135 So. 2d 245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961). Nine years had
elapsed since the highway designation, and for this reason the court ordered the issuance
of a permit for a gasoline service station. Cf. Platt v. City of New York, 276 App.
Div. 873, 93 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1949); Kirschke v. City of Houston, 330 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 474 (1960) (action in damages for failure
to issue building permit dismissed; plaintiff should have brought action for mandamus
or mandatory injunction); Hammon v. Wichita County, 290 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1956).
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lots which are unduly restricted by the official map rather than grant
hardship variances. 92 Next to be considered are several highway
laws which have codified and given statutory sanction to a purchase
requirement as an alternative to the variance remedy.
IV
HIGHWAY RESERVATION LAWS NOT BASED ON THE
VARIANCE PRINCIPLE
A. The Statutory Pattern
Because most interim control laws are directed to the municipal
and county level, state highway agencies must rely for the protec-
tion of proposed highways upon the efficiencies of local planning.
Even if an official map is authorized for all municipalities, it may
be adopted by some and not by others. Some municipalities may
administer their maps well and some may not. In metropolitan
areas, where scores of local general purpose units coexist, inconsist-
encies may develop within a limited geographic area. In rural areas,
if counties lack statutory authority, no jurisdiction may have the
power to establish official maps. These comments are applicable to
subdivision controls and setbacks as well.
To remedy the gaps in existing legislation, several states have
conferred highway reservation authority upon their state highway
agencies. These statutes do not contain a comprehensive plan re-
quirement, and they provide for the reservation of highway rights-
of-way on an ad hoc basis. The hardship variance device has been
dropped or modified, and relief for objecting owners is usually ob-
tained by compelling the purchase of land which is subject to the
highway reservation. A few states have also enacted highway reserva-
tion laws based on the compulsory purchase technique which are
applicable to counties and municipalities.
Considerable experimentation has been attempted in the non-
variance highway reservation statutes. Under the Indiana law,03
which is typical, any landowner restricted by the highway reserva-
tion may serve a notice of purchase upon the highway commission.
The commission must purchase the land or start proceedings for its
92 Davis, supra note 43, at 27, 28; Kucirek 8. Beuscher, supra note 41, at 199-200.
0HIND. ANN. STAT. § 36-2955 (Supp. 1963). For similar statutes, see N.C. Private
Laws 1927, ch. 196 (selected municipalities); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 84.295 (Supp. 1963).
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condemnation within ninety days or the reservation will lapse. The
California law94 retains the hardship variance procedure for mapped
state highways within counties. Other statutes link compulsory pur-
chase with the hardship variance. For example, a Tennessee law
applicable to the consolidated Nashville-Davidson County govern-
ment compels purchase only if a board of appeals does not grant
a variance permit to the complaining landowner or grants the per-
mit on terms which are unacceptable to him.95 In Utah, a county
board of appeals must issue a variance if the reservation has been in
force for more than one year and if the county has refused to take
steps to acquire the property.98 However, the Pennsylvania state
highway reservation laws,97 like its nineteenth century official map
legislation, contain neither a variance nor a compulsory purchase
requirement. Neither do the Montana and Washington laws,98 al-
though -they limit the highway reservation to one year. Few of the
other nonvariance highway reservation statutes place a time limit
on the reservation.
What most characterizes the nonvariance reservation laws is the
automatic nature of the purchase obligation. Most of these statutes
place the option with the landowner, and the highway commission
must purchase his land if the reservation is to remain effective. No
standards are articulated to determine whether the application real-
ly covers a hardship case for which purchase can be justified.
B. Constitutionality and Administration
The compulsory purchase provisions of the nonvariance laws
should support their constitutionality, just as the hardship variance
supports the constitutionality of the official map laws. Only in
Pennsylvania have the nonvariance state highway reservation laws
04 CAL. STmm.Ts & H'wAYs CODE §§ 740-42.05 Private Acts of Tenn. 1959, chs. 330, 356.
00 UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 17-27-7, -7.10 (1962).
07 Pennsylvania has several statutes. A divergence law provides for the mapping
of relocated highways and authorizes payment of compensation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
36, § 670-210 (1961). For a definition of divergence, see Eshelman v. Commonwealth,
325 Pa. 521, 189 Ati. 340 (1937). Two other statutes authorize highway reservations
without payment of compensation. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 36, §§ 670-206 to -208 (1961)
(widenings); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 670-219 (1961) (new locations). For discussion
of the Pennsylvania statutes, see In the Matter of Appointment of Viewers, 103 Pa.
Super. 212, 158 Ati. 296 (1931); May v. County of Westmoreland, 98 Pa. Super. 488
(1930).
08 MONT. REv. CoDES ANN. §§ 32-1615.2-.3 (Supp. 1963); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 47.28.025-.026 (1962).
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been litigated, 9 and there the case was at the trial court level.
While the statute was held constitutional on analogy to the Pennsyl-
vania official map act, neither law contains a purchase or a variance
provision; and Pennsylvania is the only state which has not reversed
early cases upholding nonvariance official map statutes. Of some
interest in Pennsylvania, however, is the frequent use by landowners
of a statutory remedy by way of inverse condemnation. Suit is
authorized against the highway agency to secure the payment of
compensation in cases where street and highway reservations are
alleged to be unduly burdensome, and the analogy to a statutory
compulsory purchase provision is clear.
In most states little use has been made of the nonvariance high.
way reservation statutes. Some state officials have doubts about their
constitutionality, and elsewhere administrators are wary of the abso-
lute nature of the purchase provision. Plans for implementation are
in progress in a few areas, and some use of the law has been made
in Washington; but that statute carries an extremely brief one year
limit. In addition, complications have arisen under a local decision
which was sketchily decided but which appears to make the state
liable for a variety of interim damage which is traceable to the
highway reservation.100
A few cities in North Carolina, however, have had long experi-
ence under a local law which authorizes purchase as an alternative
to development within the right-of-way. Several states and communi-
ties have also developed informal extrastatutory procedures for the
acquisition of hardship parcels. Some of these informal programs
99 Bentz v. Commonwealth, 75 York L. Rec. 190 (Pa. C.P. 1962); cf. Penn Builders,
Inc. v. Blair County, 802 Pa. 300, 153 AtI. 433 (1931); May v. County of Westmore-
land, 98 Pa. Super. 488 (1930). In the two cases last cited, the holdings were dicta,
since the court decided that the proceedings had in fact been brought under the
divergence law, which required the payment of damages. Cf. Hinaman v. Vandergrift,
197 Pa. Super. 140, 177 A.2d 174 (1962). A lower court dictum to the contrary can
be disregarded. Mikell v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 6 Chester 156 (Pa. C.P.
1954). The court read too much into Miller v. Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34
(1951), which held unconstitutional a park reservation statute which was similar to
the official map acts. The Miller case raised some doubts about the Pennsylvania
decisions upholding the official map acts, but it clearly did not overrule them. For
a Canadian case contrary to the Beaver Falls decision, see Regina Auto Court V. Regina,
25 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 167 (Q.B. Sask. 1958).
100 State v. Corey, 59 Wash. 2d 98, 366 P.2d 185 (1961); Letter From Edward E.
I.evel, Assistant Attorney General, State of Washington, July 30, 1962. The comments
in this paragraph are based on interviews with state highway officials. On the Nash-
ville and Davidson County experience, see Letters From Charles W. Hawkins, Execu-
tive Director, Nashville City Planning Division, Nov. 26, 1963 & July 20, 1962.
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are carried out as part of the normal land acquisition phase of high-
way construction. The federal statute authorizes advance acquisi-
tion of rights-of-way under agreements between the Bureau of Public
Roads and the state highway agency, at a point not more than seven
years in advance of actual construction. 01 In Michigan, for example,
once the route location report has been approved for highways on
which the federal government participates in right-of-way costs, the
state is authorized to buy parcels with the understanding that federal
reimbursement will be secured later.10 2
While differences in approach can be found and while some
purchase programs are more imaginative than others, striking simi-
larities stand out. In no instance is the volume of purchases very
large; estimates indicate that between five and ten per cent of
planned rights-of-way have to be purchased prior to construction. 0 3
Contrary to expectations, parcels are not often severed on new routes,
so difficult problems of calculating severance damages have been
avoided. Partly because highway location is not definite at the time
of advance acquisition, the authority acquires the entire parcel rather
than guess about the line on which it might eventually be cut.
Reservations for street widenings in cities are more complicated,
primarily because a larger number of improved parcels are affected.
Greensboro, North Carolina, acting under a local law authorizing
hardship purchases, has been successful in acquiring entire proper-
ties, tearing down existing structures when they are inadequate, and
reassembling the remainders for resale and further development.
When business leases expire and a new tenant cannot be located or
asks for terms less favorable to the landowner, the city assists by ad-
vising the property owner regarding the length of time remaining
101 Federal-Aid Highway Act § 108, 72 Stat. 893 (1958), as amended, 23 U.S.C. § 108
(Supp. IV, 1963).
202 Federal approval of advance acquisition depends upon individual agreements
with each state. Considerable differences in Bureau of Public Roads policy appear
from state to state, and its policy is more lenient in some areas than in others. Some
difficulties have resulted from the fact that normal land acquisition processes must
be utilized. For example, complex eminent domain procedures must be used for each
parcel. Of the places observed, only Greensboro, N. C., had statutory authority for
its purchase program.
103 These observations confirm a similar report from Houston, Texas, where the
advance acquisition of individual parcels in planned right-of-way has been authorized
for some time under special enabling legislation. Address by W. J. Van London,
Engineer-Manager, Houston Urban Expressways, to the American Association of State
Highway Officials, Annual Meeting, December, 1950. At that time, less than five per
cent of the total right-of-way appropriations was being spent on advance acquisitions.
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before acquisition; and a new lease may be negotiated on this basis.
If the remaining time is too short, the property may be acquired.
Investment for remodeling and repair is also affected by the time
problem. Improvements may be permitted in Greensboro if they
do not increase costs substantially and if acquisition is sufficiently
distant.
The surprising fact about these purchase programs is that they
have worked remarkably well, considering that almost all of them
are operated without statutory authority. However, the need for a
more formal statutory structure is often expressed by highway ad-
ministrators, and it is clearly apparent from this discussion.
V
TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE INTERIM CONTROL LAv' 04
This review of techniques for interim control of highway rights-
of-way has indicated deficiencies in the existing legislation as it is
applied to state highway systems. Existing controls are largely ap-
plied to exclude new structures from proposed rights-of-way. Only
subdivision controls are effective in controlling the area adjacent to
the highway, and their application is limited to the subdivision of
raw land for urban development. The modem highway, which
exerts an impact far beyond its confines, requires more inclusive
control if damaging impacts are to be prevented prior to construc-
tion. Relief must also be available to the landowner who is un-
reasonably restricted by interim regulation, but the relief afforded
must not be excessively disadvantageous to the highway program.
The following steps are suggested for implementing an interim con-
trol policy which would respond more satisfactorily to the needs of
a modem highway system.
A. Statewide Comprehensiveness
A highway network which is statewide would require an admin-
istrative control which could be operated from the state level. There
are two dimensions to this problem. A review of the decisions has
demonstrated that the courts are more willing to accept a temporary
1°0A more detailed explanation of this proposal, together with the draft of a
model act, is contained in the report from which this article is adapted. Many of the
suggestions which are made here have already been incorporated in the New York
county official map enabling law. N.Y. Muir'. LAw §§ 239-g to -k. The influence of
English planning legislation is also acknowledged. See particularly the Town and
Country Planning Act, 1962, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, c. 38, part VIII, §§ 138-51.
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restriction on the use of property when it is imposed as part of a
comprehensive plan for community development than when it is
imposed ad hoc. Interim protection of individual highways would
be helped measurably by the adoption of a statewide highway plan
to which a temporary restriction on development could be related.
Some states, such as Ohio and Wisconsin, are in the process of devel-
oping plans of this kind, and the fulfillment of a comprehensive
highway plan requirement at the state level should not be insuper-
able.
The second dimension to highway planning and control at the
state level raises a more difficult problem-the provision of a state
agency which could exercise a uniform and consistent supervision
of the entire highway network. In the absence of an effective state
urban agency in American jurisdictions, the control authority would
probably have to be the state highway department; and interdepart-
mental coordination and executive direction would have to be relied
upon to correct departmental bias. Conflicts between the state high-
way agency and local planning and highway authorities would occur
over route location and the administration of controls. Machinery
to settle route location disputes already exists in some states, and it
could be adapted to the interim control zone. Once the route was
settled, administration of controls could be delegated to local and
regional authorities, who would function under state supervision.
So startling a reorientation in state-local relationships would impose
substantial limits on local autonomy, and the division of authority
between state and local agencies would prove troublesome, even
apart from the political fact of local resistance to state control. High-
way systems have a statewide impact, however, and some shift in the
governmental balance of power is inevitable as the state interest in
its highway investment is increasingly recognized and protected.
Delegation of administrative authority to municipalities under
supervision from above has ample precedent in England, where this
system is widely used.
B. All-Inclusive Land Development Controls
Existing statutes which only control development in the right-
of-way miss the impact of modem highways, which have a substantial
effect upon surrounding properties as well. One solution is a high-
way control zone which would extend a reasonable distance on each
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side of a projected right-of-way and which would also protect the
area surrounding proposed interchanges. Within the zone no land
development of any kind could proceed without permission from
the state highway agency or its local delegate. Development, in turn,
would be defined broadly to include not only subdivision but also
any building construction and any change in the use of land.
Several advantages would be afforded by this proposed system.
It would borrow the more successful administrative technique of
subdivision control, which applies land use regulations at the time
at which development occurs. An important result would be that the
highway agency could deal flexibly with development pressures as they
arose. For example, a residential subdivision might be allowed if it
did not interfere with the highway, but it might be conditioned, as
in the case of subdivision control, upon a dedication or reserva-
tion for highway uses. One knotty problem involving a division of
authority would be potential conflicts with local zoning. Perhaps
some system could be worked out which would give the state high-
way department a veto within the control zone whenever the local
zoning designation impaired the traffic-carrying capacity of the high-
way. The veto might be used, for example, over strip commercial
zoning which would clog the approaches to an interchange.
C. Relief for Hardship Gases
An administrative system in which applications for development
were made directly to the state highway agency would force it to be
realistic about its highway intentions. These intentions would have
to give way, for example, if pressures mounted while construction
lagged. Should it decide to refuse development of a parcel, however,
an equitable method of relief would have to be provided. Outright
purchase would appear preferable to the use of the hardship vari-
ance, but automatic purchase at the behest of the landowner seems
too harsh. Compulsory acquisition should be tied to the proof of
the unique hardship which is required under zoning variance pro-
visions. What the property owner claims when he asks the highway
agency to take his property is that he has suffered a hardship because
the land is unusable by him. In the context of a market-oriented
society, his complaint is that the property will not earn him a fair re-
turn, an expectation which is reflected in the test for variances under
official map laws. An even more objective test can be constructed if
potential return is capitalized in the purchase price, which reflects
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both appreciation and depreciation in value which is attributable to
the highway. The market can therefore provide an objective test of
the owner's contentions. 1°0 If the property is not salable, or if it is
not salable at a fair price, purchase by the highway agency should
be required.
While the hardship purchase provision appears relatively simple
in concept, some difficult administrative problems must be solved.
One is that the highway agency may permit some development in
the control zone, but not the development which the landowner
desired. For example, residential development might be permitted
although an industrial park was requested. Standards would have
to be devised to determine when the development permitted was
still so restrictive that the purchase piovision should apply.10 6
Furthermore, when development was successfully forbidden or when
the landowner held his land until the highway agency moved to
acquire it, the rules of compensation would have to be adjusted so
that no injury was done. Compensation might have to be paid for
the loss of a return on the property affected during the interim
period. Equally helpful would be enactment of a rule which dis-
counted any depreciation or enhancement attributable to the high-
way from the eminent domain award.10 7 These and other compensa-
tion problems have been discussed earlier.
105 Inability to sell at a reasonable price as a test of fair return finds strong support
in the New York zoning variance cases. Forrest v. Evershed, 7 N.Y.2d 256, 164 N.E.2d
841 (1959), citing Crone v. Town of Brighton, 19 Misc. 2d 1023, 119 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup.
t. 1952). In Bellamy v. Board of Appeals, 32 Misc. 2d 520, 524, 223 N.Y.S.2d 1017,
1021 (Sup. Ct. 1962), the court noted that the Evershed case was "rapidly reaching
cited statute as a legal monument . Accord, Stevens v. Horn, 243 N.Y.S.2d 285
(Sup. Ct. 1963); Shaw v. Giglio, 31 Misc. 2d 282, 220 N.Y.S.2d 44 (Sup. Ct. 1961). For
a similar point of view in other states, see Homan v. Lynch, 51 Del. 433, 147 A.2d
650 (1959); Boyer v. Zoning Bd., 27 Lehigh L.J. 272 (Pa. C.P. 1957); Board of Adjust-
ment v. Procasco, 69 Dauph. 204 (Pa. C.P. 1956).
100 Problems will also arise in cases where the refusal to develop a parcel within
the control zone will depress somewhat the price of the affected property, but not
substantially. In these cases, it would be too much of a burden on the highway
agency to purchase the property. Some alternative method of compensation might
be worked out. For example, annual loss of return on the affected property could be
calculated, and the highway agency could pay this to the property owner prior and
up to the time the property was acquired. Provisions for the purchase of restricted
property or for payment of compensation representing loss of return should obviate
any need for tax forgiveness, which has sometimes been suggested as a complementary
mode of relief to the landowner. Since the landowner would either be relieved of
his property or compensated for any interim loss, any inequities which might occur
through the continued payment of taxes would be removed.
1o7For the handling of these problems under the English statutes, see Land Com-
pensation Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 33, part II, §§ 6, 7, 9, Section 9 discounts
depreciation, but not enhancement in value, which is attributable to the taking.
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VI
CONCLUSION
Time lag between the planning and completion of highway proj-
ects has stimulated control techniques to preserve rights-of-way from
interim encroachments. While difficult constitutional questions are
raised by the restriction of privately held land from development
pending public acquisition, judicial acceptance of existing controls
gives encouragement that the constitutional objections can be over-
come. Building upon judicial decisions and administrative experi-
ence, this article has suggested an interim control proposal which
turns the constitutional strong points of existing legislation to good
administrative advantage.
Taking a cue from court decisions which put heavy emphasis
upon the need for an escape provision and relying upon favorable
judicial acceptance of the application technique of subdivision regu-
lation, the highway control zone suggested in this article incorporates
a purchase mechanism as an escape procedure and relies upon a
development permission requirement for enforcement. In this man-
ner, it avoids the pitfall of official maps, which invite constitutional
trouble by restrictively limiting the use of land in advance of its
development. Instead, the decision to allow or forbid development
within the control zone is made at the time of application. The pur-
chase mechanism provides an administrative escape which should
surmount constitutional hurdles and which makes the exhaustion
principle available as a shield against frontal attack. The result is
a flexible method of control, with regulatory and administrative ad-
vantages which have already been explained.
Interstate and related expressway systems require a substantial
public investment. Necessary time lags in execution present a diffi-
cult problem of interim protection, for highways attract land devel-
opers who make substantial commitments to reap the increment
which access to a highway will bring. This article has reviewed the
existing techniques for providing interim controls, and hopefully it
will stimulate a discussion of new legal methods to meet the demands
our modern highway needs have imposed.
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